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1. Introduction  
Bangladesh implemented a national conditional cash transfer program called the Female 
Stipend Program (FSP) in 1993. Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) incentivize 
investments in human capital by providing cash payments to targeted groups. These programs 
are often part of poverty reduction strategies or used as social safety nets for disadvantaged 
populations. After Mexico’s Progresa demonstrated success in educational attainments in the 
1990s, domestic and international actors encouraged the spread of CCT programs to over 130 
developing countries in order to achieve a variety of development indicators. Bangladesh’s 
program made remarkable progress, dramatically increasing girls’ enrollment in secondary 
school and ending the gender gap in education. It has since reversed the gender gap has and now 
girls slightly outperform boys in literacy rates and attendance rates. The Punjab province of 
Pakistan implemented a similar program, the Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSS) in 2004 
and successfully increased secondary school enrollment for girls by 10%, but both regionally and 
nationally, Pakistan has been unable to achieve gender parity in education.  
In this paper, I compare the two programs and argue that Bangladesh’s conditional cash 
transfer program was more successful. First, I examine the relevant literature on conditional cash 
transfers. In the methodology section, I explain why I chose to examine the programs in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh to discern the impact of societal differences on the effectiveness of CCT 
programs. The case studies for each country analyzes the program’s origins, designs, and 
outcomes, as well as political actors. The comparison section identifies four factors; program 
design, differences in the education system, political analysis, and economic changes in 
Bangladesh, as possible answers for why it was able to reverse the gender gap. Finally, the paper 
will draw upon lessons from Bangladesh’s success, in order to provide recommendations for 
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Pakistan. My research suggests reasons why Bangladesh’s program was able to overcome the 
gender gap, while Pakistan did not. However, due to the limited availability of data, it is 
impossible to conclude which of the factors had greater influence. This paper seeks to contribute 
to the literature on Conditional Cash Transfers, which currently lacks analysis of country 
similarities or differences contributing to CCT success, as well as studies of South Asian CCTs. 
My paper concludes that despite their similarities, including shared history and cultural practices 
impacting girls’ education, the conditions in Bangladesh were more ideal for reducing the gender 
gap through a CCT program.    
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Summary of the Literature  
While conditional cash transfer programs share some commonalities, domestic 
policymakers design each program with conditions, selection methods, and benefit amounts 
depending on the context and the program’s goals. The literature on the subject is largely made 
up of evaluations of these programs and their ability to impact children’s education and health, 
political engagement, and women’s empowerment. In many cases, different CCT programs were 
successful at improving attendance and retention in school, use of health services, trust in 
government, and household consumption.  
 The empirical evidence on the effects of Conditional Cash transfers is fairly extensive. It 
consists of econometric studies, papers, books, papers containing qualitative evaluations and 
surveys of individual programs, and peer-reviewed journal articles. The Overseas Development 
Institute, a think-tank in London, provided a broader comprehensive report of several 
Conditional Cash transfer programs, and more studies like this would be helpful for observing 
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patterns and generalizations among CCT outcomes. Fiszbein’s source published by The World 
Bank also provided general conclusions about a variety of CCT programs. The literature is 
frequently divided into time periods or “waves,” and predominantly made up of studies of the 
first “wave,” which were implemented in the 1990s-2000s.  Progresa and La Bolsa Familia in 
Mexico and Brazil are usually considered the first wave and subsequent programs, particularly 
those outside of Latin America, are referred to as the second wave. In Figure 1, the spread of 
CCTs around the world over time is depicted and divides them into waves. Note that in this 
publication, Bangladesh is considered part of the first wave. Even though Bangladesh’s CCT, 
Female Secondary School Stipend Programme, occurred during the first wave, it has attracted 
relatively less scholarly attention compared to Progresa and La Bolsa Familia. This is a 
noticeable trend in the literature. CCTs from the second wave and from non-Latin American 
countries are more likely to be shorter papers, and very few books have been published on them. 
Meanwhile, entire books have been written on just Latin American CCTs or even just on 
Progresa. Research on the more recent and second wave of CCTs and CCTs in developing 
countries outside of Latin America are currently underrepresented in the literature and should be 
further explored. The distribution and density of CCT programs worldwide is shown in Figure 1, 
making it clear that a significant number of studies used in the Overseas Development Institute 
report were from Latin America.1  
                                                 
1 “Cash Transfers: What Does the Evidence Say? A Rigorous Review of Programme Impact and of the Role of 
Design and Implementation Features.” Overseas Development Institute (ODI), July 2016. 
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2.2 Context 
International context is an important factor in understanding why CCTs became widely 
introduced and studied. In the 1980s, the global economy experienced a downturn and many 
countries initiated neoliberal reforms and reductions in government spending to alleviate the 
crises.2 This led to increased pressure from international financial institutions for “efficiency” in 
social spending and a reduction of social protection programs.3 Towards the end of the 1990s, 
international financial institutions became more interested in poverty reduction, and required 
lending governments to produce Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) to encourage 
                                                 
2 Michelle Adato And John Hoddinott, Eds., Conditional Cash Transfers In Latin America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
3 Ibid.  
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countries to manage their debt and as CCTs spread, they were often part of these PRSPs.4  
Gender also came into focus in development policy world around this time. An international 
consensus was reached at the 1995 at fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing that 
women faced a “persistent and increasing burden of poverty,” and afterwards it was widely 
published that women made up 70% of the world’s poor.5 Governments began “mainstreaming” 
gender into their Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) papers and academics around the world 
began exploring the concept of “gendered poverty.”6 This international context played an 
important role in the spread of female-focused microcredit schemes, CCTs, and other gender-
focused development strategies that sought to reduce gender inequality and poverty. Girl’s 
education is often chosen as a “safe,” non-controversial, and attainable first step towards 
empowerment, and thus donors and international agencies like the World Bank have actively 
encouraged and funded female education in the Global South.7 Additionally, the Millennium 
Development Goals launched in September 2000 placed pressure on countries to conform to 
specific and categorized human development indicators including health, education, women’s 
empowerment, and maternal and child mortality rates. These goals and indicators were 
frequently used in the design of CCTs and in their evaluations.  
Individual cash transfer programs can be designed for a number of reasons by various 
actors with their own agendas, but they share similar international context, and most can trace 
their origins to Mexico’s Progresa program. From 1994-1995, Mexico experienced an economic 
                                                 
4 Sarah Bradshaw And Brian Linneker, “Poverty Alleviation In A Changing Policy And Political Context: The Case 
Of Prsps With Particular Reference To Nicaragua,” In The International Handbook Of Gender And Poverty 
(Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, 2010), 1-25.  
5 Ibid., 9-12.  
6 Ibid., 10-13.  
7 Elora Shehabuddin, Reshaping the Holy: Democracy, Development, and Muslim Women in Bangladesh (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 133. 
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crisis, and the new administration under Ernesto Zedillo decided to phase out food subsidy 
programs and instead provide cash grants to poor families under conditions.8 The Programa de 
Educacion, Salud, y Alimentacion, or Progresa, provided monetary transfers to female heads of 
house in exchange for children’s regular attendance at school from the third years of primary and 
secondary school and regular health center visits.9 Progresa encouraged parents to send their 
children to school, and the cash payments were supposed to make up the opportunity cost of 
children’s time in school that they could have spent earning income for the family.10 Affirmative 
action was present in the program design; girl students received a 10% higher stipend than 
boys.11 Making the cash transfers to female heads of house was a calculated decision in the 
Progresa program that became replicated in many of the following programs in other countries. 
The rationale behind this design choice is that women are more responsible than men in 
household management and children’s needs.12 In poor households, some theorized that 
household income tended to be skewed towards men’s consumption, leaving women and 
children in “secondary poverty,” and that expenditure by women would be better directed 
towards household needs. 13 The program saw an increase of 9% points for girl’s enrollment in 
secondary school and 5-6% points for boys.14 There was significant reduction in grade repetition 
and dropout rates, as well as increases in progression rates in both primary and secondary 
school.15 Long-run estimated years of schooling increased across age groups when compared to 
                                                 
8 Adato and Hoddinott, 191-210. 
9 Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet, “Making Conditional Cash Transfer Programs More Efficient: Designing 
for Maximum Effect of the Conditionality,” The World Bank Economic Review 20, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 1–29. 
10 Ibid.,  
11 Maxine Molyneux, “Mothers At The Service Of The New Poverty Agenda: Progresa/Oportunidades, Mexico’s 
Conditional Transfer Programme,” 425–49.  
12 Ibid., 425–49. 
13 Ibid., 425–49. 
14 Adato and Hoddinott, 191-210.  
15 Ibid., 191-210. 
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pre-program.16 Progresa also led to 18.2% more visits to clinics compared to areas where no 
program occurred.17 Progresa’s impacts were measured by sampling families and surveying 
them for a year before and after the program started, as well as in the following months.18 The 
program reached over 300,000 households, 344 localities, 12 states, and had a budget of around 
$60 million US dollars.19 When it was remodeled into Oportunidades, it reached all states and 
had a budget of $3 billion.20 The success of Progresa contributed to the international culture of 
poverty reduction through CCTs and similar programs, and there is evidence that The World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank encouraged the project and its replication in 
other countries.21  
2.3 Design  
Most of the sources reached a consensus that design was the most important factor of a 
successful CCT program. Policymakers must consider the individual country and its context and 
goals, and the literature was critical of international pressure to adopt CCTs, warning that the 
programs had to be designed for the country and not simply replicated. When designing CCT 
programs, the costs and risks associated with targeting and conditions must be kept in mind. 
Well-calibrated targeting incurs high administrative costs, while poorly targeted programs run 
the risk of mismanagement or exclusion.22 Successful targeting also relies on extensive 
information collection and can include single national registries and ID cards.23 For example, 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 191-210. 
17 Ibid., 214 
18 de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1–29.  
19 Adato and Hoddinott,, 1-5.  
20 Ibid. 1-5.  
21 Ibid., 1-5. 
22 Francesca Bastagli, “Conditional Cash Transfers as a Tool of Social Policy.” Economic and Political Weekly 46, 
no. 21 (2011): 61–66. 
23 Ibid., 61–66. 
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targeting mechanisms in Latin America are determined using a proxy means test, requiring the 
collection of information to rank potential beneficiaries and create a welfare score.24 The 
literature also covered the conditional aspect of the programs. Conditionality requires 
compliance by the beneficiaries and follow-through verification of that compliance. Conditions 
have to be balanced with the program goals in mind as well as the ability of the targeted 
population to achieve those goals. Conditions that are too stringent can place disproportionate 
burdens on families, misperceptions of the purpose of the programs, and other unintended 
effects.25 Conditional cash transfer programs are expensive to implement and there was pressure 
to avoid inefficiency in design, particularly in targeting and conditions, to provide measurable 
improvements in program goals.   
2.4 Outcomes 
In terms of human capital, the most consistent improvement CCTs across all the literature 
had to do with use of services, such as increased enrollment and use of health services. CCTs 
improved quantitative indicators for children’s education and health. The Overseas Development 
Institute found that a majority of the CCT consistently increased school attendance and reduced 
absences.26 However, CCTs in general did not appear to positively influence test scores. Cash 
transfers can increase indicators like school attendance but not necessarily “improved learning 
outcomes.”27  This makes sense when one examines the rationale behind CCTs; providing cash 
incentives acts as a demand side policy. The supply side is where many of the indicators fell 
short, because increasing demand for services using CCTs are only as helpful as the quality of 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 61–66. 
25 Ibid., 61–66. 
26 “Cash Transfers: What Does the Evidence Say? A Rigorous Review of Programme Impact and of the Role of 
Design and Implementation Features.” Overseas Development Institute (ODI), July 2016. 
27 Ibid.  
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care provided. If schools or health facilities are understaffed, underfunded, poorly managed, or 
are prejudiced against minority groups, then the effectiveness of CCTs were drastically reduced. 
As a result, many authors recommended that supply side improvements in health and education 
should be implemented alongside CCTs to maximize effectiveness. 
The literature also makes it clear that while CCTs can be used as a tool of poverty reduction, 
they cannot singlehandedly correct multi-generation poverty. That is why some authors, like 
Kapur, Mukhopadhyay, and Subramanian, recommend viewing CCTs more like social safety 
nets or welfare schemes to provide income to households “to cross the poverty threshold,” rather 
than as aiming to achieve specific economic development goals.28 These authors argue that 
without economic or state reform, anti-poverty schemes like CCTs are simply an improvement 
“over the status quo by helping to improve access of the poor to goods and services.”29  
In addition to the gap in the literature about CCTs in South Asia, many of the comprehensive 
reports, like ODI and the World Bank Report, lacked analysis on how political, economic, and 
bureaucratic differences might affect outcomes. In the impact reports, there was evidence that 
developing countries and their political leadership had an impact on programs according to their 
own agendas as well as economic and cultural pressures. Morais de Sa e Silva notes that the 
political implications for CCTs are unique; the programs are very adjustable to incoming parties 
and their priorities, and yet, the programs do not have any sort of constitutional guarantee.30 For 
example, Mexico’s CCT program Progresa became much more conservative after the center 
                                                 
28 Devesh Kapur, Partha Mukhopadhyay, And Arvind Subramanian, “More On Direct Cash Transfers,” Economic 
And Political Weekly 43, No. 47 (2008): 85–87. 
29 Ibid., 85–87. 
30 Michelle Morais De Sa E Silva, Poverty Reduction, Education, And The Global Diffusion Of Conditional Cash 
Transfers (New York, Ny: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017). 
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right Fox administration remodeled it into Oportunidades.31 In Nicaragua, the Red de Proteccion 
Social CCT program began as a way to combat the economic crisis created by the falling coffee 
prices in the early 2000s, but was eventually adapted due to pressure from international financial 
institutions, changes in government, and other factors.32 Bradshaw suggests that the Catholic 
Church’s influence made the early program more about family values and emphasized women’s 
role as mothers.33  All of these case studies that analyzed political context were in Latin America. 
While country specific impact reports would provide detailed information on the programs, 
countries and their context, information about political and economic context was much less 
present when comparing CCTs in broader evaluations of CCTs like The World Bank Report or 
the ODI report. Additionally, while it was acknowledged that girls’ education faced similar 
barriers across developing countries, such as income, it was unclear if similar cultural attitudes 
about girls’ education or other similarities between countries would have an impact on the 
program’s success. My research, therefore, sought to contribute to two gaps in the literature; as 
lack of studies on South Asian CCTs and whether similarities or differences between countries 
contributed to CCT success.  
3. Methodology 
In order to compare Bangladesh’s FSP and Pakistan’s FSSS, I decided to compile two 
detailed case studies of each program and its origins, design, outcomes, and analysis of political 
actors. In writing these case studies, I used government and IGO websites and peer reviewed 
journals to describe and analyze the programs and their outcomes. I examined impact reports that 
                                                 
31 Maxine Molyneux, “Mothers At The Service Of The New Poverty Agenda: Progresa/Oportunidades, Mexico’s 
Conditional Transfer Programme,” Social Policy And Administration 40, No. 4 (August 2006): 425–49. 
32 Shahrashoub Razavi, The Gendered Impacts Of Liberalization: Towards “Embedded Liberalism”? (London: 
Routledge, 2011). 
33 Sarah Bradshaw And Brian Linneker, “Poverty Alleviation In A Changing Policy And Political Context: The Case 
Of Prsps With Particular Reference To Nicaragua. 
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had been sponsored by a variety of NGOs and international financial institutions, including the 
World Bank. I used data from the World Bank and UNICEF to compare development indicators 
and statistics between South Asian countries. I also examined newspaper articles from 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, in order to gauge opinions and news about the stipend programs and 
girls’ education in the media. Comparisons of the conditional cash transfer programs of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh were ideal for a number 
of reasons. Research on the more recent and second wave of CCTs and CCTs in developing 
countries outside of Latin America are currently underrepresented in the literature, which made 
the programs in Bangladesh and Pakistan appropriate for further study. 
Additionally, comparisons between these programs and two countries are useful because 
Pakistan and Bangladesh share some significant historical, economic, and social context. Both 
countries are part of the Indian sub-continent. As former British colonies, news sources and 
papers on Pakistan and Bangladesh are more widely available in English, making them easier to 
research. They were formerly known as West and East Pakistan respectively until Bangladesh 
gained its independence in 1971.34 Pakistan and Bangladesh are also ideal for comparison in 
terms of human and economic development. In 2017, they had a similar GDP per capita in USD, 
with Pakistan at $1, 547 and Bangladesh at $1, 516 (World Bank).35 They also share the Medium 
Human Development Rank category. There are also a few differences worth mentioning as well. 
Bangladesh is more ethnically homogenous than Pakistan. Around 98% of the country are 
Bengali and speak Bengali, the national language, while Pakistan is made up of many ethnic 
groups and languages.36 Both countries are parliamentary republics, but Pakistan is a federal 
                                                 
34 The World Factbook 2013-14, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013. 
35 World Bank National Accounts Data and OECD National Accounts Data Files, The World Bank Group, 2018. 
https://data.worldbank.org/.  
36 The World Factbook 2013-14. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013. 
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parliamentary republic.37 Pakistan is larger and has a population of about 207,862,518, while 
Bangladesh has 159,453,001.38  
Another important factor is that they are both majority Muslim-populated South Asian 
countries and are highly influenced by Islamic values and practices. The state religion of 
Pakistan is Islam, and 96.4% of the population identifies as Muslim, while 89.1% of the 
population of Bangladesh identifies as Muslim.39 This makes them even more ideal for 
comparison, as they have a similar source of patriarchal cultural practices that have been justified 
by religion. Being South Asian countries, they also share in the cultural practice of purdah, 
meaning “curtain,” which refers to the systematic seclusion of women to the home and private 
life.40 The purdah limits interactions between men and women, enforcing standards on female 
modesty, and is practiced by both Muslims and Hindus in South Asia.41 The extent of purdah as 
a practice varies with an individual’s class, region, and religious practices. It can involve the 
covering of the entire body and can create a division of labor that restrict women to domestic 
duties and force them to rely on men for access to goods and services outside the home. The 
purdah has a significant impact on girls’ education in both countries. It can restrict mobility and 
women’s access to public space, which can prevent them from receiving an education in the first 
place. Even if some parents are willing to send their daughters to school and college, they may 
‘insist on some degree of purdah observance … [or] will usually not send them unless the 
teachers as well as the principal of the all-girls school are women.”42 This cultural practice 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 The World Factbook.  
40 Hanna Papanek, “Purdah: Separate Worlds and Symbolic Shelter,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 
15, no. 3 (1973): 290.  
41 Ibid, 290.  
42 Ibid, 311.  
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necessitates explicit attention and funding of girls’ education, to meet the cultural practices of 
purdah when parents are willing to educate their daughters.  In the literature, authors caution 
about replicating CCTs exactly, as programs should take into account the unique context of the 
country. Cultural and political differences would certainly play a role in the success of the 
program, even if the countries share similar patriarchal values and norms like the purdah. 
The programs themselves were ideal for comparison, because they had the same target 
population, girls in secondary school. It is worth noting that in Bangladesh, secondary school 
refers to grades six through 10, with no concept of middle school, while in Pakistan, middle 
school consists of grades six through eight, and secondary school refers to grades nine through 
ten. Both programs are referred to as secondary school stipend programs, and both target girls in 
these grade categories, so throughout the paper, secondary school will refer to grades six through 
ten, for both countries.  
4. Case Study: Bangladesh 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The national Female Stipend Program in Bangladesh played an important role in 
dramatically increasing girls’ enrollment in secondary school and ending the gender gap in 
education. In 1990, the gross national secondary school enrollment for girls was 13.67%, 
compared to 26.8% for boys.43 In 2016, gross national secondary school enrollment was 72.49% 
for girls and 65.61% for boys.44 Other positive short and long-term impacts among stipend 
participants were also observed. Bangladesh’s achievements in gender parity in education 
prompted the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report to claim that Bangladesh 
                                                 
43 “World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files,” The World Bank Group, 2018.   
https://data.worldbank.org/.  Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age group that corresponds to the level of education.  
44 Ibid. 
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was “leading South Asia in terms of gender equality” in 2017.45 However, while the program 
improved select indicators, problematic trends and program design aspects were also detected. 
The female secondary school stipend required coordination between the government, non-
government organizations, and international donors, and the program’s outcomes revealed 
tensions between these actors. This case study will cover the program’s origins, design, and 
outcomes, in order to analyze the program’s successes and shortcomings.  
4.2 Origins 
In 1982, the Bangladesh Association for Community Education (BACE), a national non-
governmental organization (NGO), began the Female Secondary School Stipend Project (FSP) in 
the Shahrasti and Kaharole upazilas, with financial support from USAID and the Asia 
Foundation. 46 In 1992, NORAD, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, assumed 
funding responsibilities, and coverage was increased to seven upazilas.47 The project was scaled 
up to a national program in 1993 with increased technical and financial support from 
international actors.48 BACE was founded by Dr. M.A. Sattar in 1977 in order to promote 
education by achieving universal primary education, “reducing dropouts of students from 
primary and secondary school level, educating unemployed youth, and promoting educational 
levels specifically for women.”49 The term NGO refers to organizations outside of government 
control that are engaged in providing financial or non-financial services to a community.50 NGOs 
are accountable to their donors, who are motivated to fund these services when they perceive that 
                                                 
45 World Economic Forum, The Global Gender Gap Report: 2017 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2017). 
46 Ibid; Upazilas are the administrative regions of Bangladesh, of which there are 492.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Anna T Schurmann, “Review of the Bangladesh Female Secondary School Stipend Project Using a Social 
Exclusion Framework,” Journal of Health, Population, and Nutrition 27, no. 4 (August 2009): 505–517.  
49 “Bangladesh Association for Community Education (BACE).” www.bd-directory.com, 2014. http://www.bd-
directory.com/Bangladesh_Association_for_Community_Education.html.    
50 Sajjad Zohir, “NGO Sector in Bangladesh: An Overview,” Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 39, No. 36 (Sep. 
4-10, 2004), pp. 4109-4113. 
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governments have failed to do so.51 NGOs in Bangladesh must be registered to maintain their 
not-for-profit status, and BACE has been “registered with the Registrar of Joint Stock 
Companies since 1978, and also registered with the Social Welfare Department of the 
Government of Bangladesh since March 22, 2010.”52  
In 2000, Bangladesh committed to the Millennium Development Goals, which included 
Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education.53 This goal sought to ensure that, “by 2015, 
children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary 
schooling.”54 The Bangladeshi government made primary education (grades 1-5) compulsory 
and free in 1990.55 In both primary and secondary schooling, a gender gap was observable (see 
Figure 2). In particular, girls at that time were very rarely progressing to secondary school.  
Figure 2: Gross Enrollment in 1990 
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files, The World 
Bank Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/  
 Primary School Secondary School  
Girls  73.86% 13.67% 
Boys 87.64% 26.8% s 
 
As young girls in Bangladesh reach adolescence, cultural factors and income become 
significant barriers to their education. While current legislation prohibits child marriage, it has 
been a pervasive practice due to cultural norms or financial burdens on families.56 Violence 
against women in Bangladesh is also highly prevalent, taking the form of acid attacks, stalking, 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 4109 
52 Ibid., 4110.  
53 UNICEF Bangladesh, “A perspective on gender equality in Bangladesh, From young girl to adolescent: What is 
lost in Transition? Analysis based on selected results of the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2009,” 2011. 
ttps://www.unicef.org/bangladesh/Gender_paper_Final_2011_Low.pdf. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.   
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‘eve teasing,’ and sexual assault. These two factors, marriage and safety, are serious deterrents 
on decisions to educate daughters.  
In addition to these social pressures for girls to drop out, secondary schools across 
Bangladesh were not free at the time, and compulsory and free primary school only covered 
grades 1-5. Although the government tended to provide 80% or so of teacher salaries through 
subventions and provides accreditation, 95% of the secondary schools were privately run, 
charged tuition, and were managed by a community-based School Management Committees 
(SMC) “with broad local power over school affairs, including over the hiring and dismissal of 
teachers.”57 This tuition and additional costs of uniforms, books, examination fees provided an 
additional deterrent to educating girls. Studies have shown that impoverished households are 
even less likely to send girls to school compared to their male siblings.58 Girls provide more 
“child labor inputs to the household’s economic activities and domestic chores,” and thus poor 
households are more likely to rely on girls’ labor.59 Females may also enroll in school but be 
forced to drop out for any of these factors. Due to this direct relationship between parental 
income and girl’s enrollment in school, conditional cash transfers have become a popular 
development strategy because they ease the financial deterrents associated with girls’ education 
and incentivize investments in girls’ education. The Female Stipend Program was introduced to 
tackle these challenges in maintaining girl’s education after adolescence.  
 
 
                                                 
57 Simeen Mahmud, “Female Secondary School Stipend Programme in Bangladesh: A Critical Assessment.” 
UNESCO: EFA Global Monitoring Report 2003/4, The Leap to Equality. Bangladesh Institute of Development 
Studies, 2004, 67-92. 
58 Ibid., 67-92. 
59 Ibid., 67-92. 
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4.3 Program Design 
The goal of the program was to increase girls’ enrollment and retain them in secondary 
education, assist them in passing the SSC examination to enhance their employment 
opportunities, and delay age of marriage.60 The program provided payment of the girl’s tuition 
fees and a monthly stipend and was conditional on 75% attendance of the school year, at least 
45% marks on exams, and remaining unmarried.61 These conditions were chosen in order to  
make up the cost of sending girls to school, improve quality by “putting pressure for good 
performance,” and delay girls’ marriage “to achieve social and demographic goals.”62 It was 
hoped that these conditions would create long-term contributions to gender equity in 
Bangladesh.63To be eligible for the program, female students had to be enrolled in recognized 
institutions in rural upazilas where the program was taking place.64  
Stipends were awarded to the girls directly. Participants opened and learned how to 
operate an account in upazila branches of a nationalized bank.65 Additionally, if a bank was more 
than 5 kilometers from the school, “temporary booths” were set up at the school to allow girls to 
withdraw the stipend money.66 This system, according to Mahmud, “empowered” girls by giving 
them agency over their own finances and minimized leakages by keeping school authorities out 
of the process.67 The program recipients received the stipend through bank accounts in two 
installments, and the amount increased with grade level, as shown below.68   
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 Figure 3: Rates of stipend and tuition per month in Taka 
Source: Simeen Mahmud, “Female Secondary School Stipend Programme in Bangladesh: A Critical 
Assessment.”  
Grade Stipend Tuition Book 
Allowance 
SSC Exam 
Fee 
  Government Non-gov.   
6 25 10 15   
7 30 12 15   
8 35 12 15   
9 60 15 20 250  
10 60 15 20  500 
By 2004, the program covered 460 of the some 492 upazilas in Bangladesh. The number of 
participants fluctuated with changes to the program’s targeting during renewals, but at the 
program’s height, over 4 million girls were receiving the stipend (Figure 4).  
Figure 4: Number of Girls Receiving Stipends, 1999-2005 
Source: Schurmann, Anna T, “Review of the Bangladesh Female Secondary School 
Stipend Project Using a Social Exclusion Framework,” Journal of Health, Population, and 
Nutrition 27, no. 4 (August 2009): 505–17.   
Year Number of Girls receiving stipends 
1999 3, 564, 404 
2000 3, 961, 194 
2001 4, 191, 058 
2002 4, 193, 352 
2003 3, 467, 123 
2004 2, 356, 856 
2005 2, 270, 343 
The national program was launched in 1993 and received increased technical and 
financial support from international actors, including NORAD, the World Bank, the government 
of Bangladesh, and the Asian Development Bank. 69 Each program and its corresponding 
organization covered specific upazilas; for example, SESIP was run by ADB. Control of the 
program within the government shifted throughout the years; it began as a pilot program under 
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and was later scaled up to a national program and 
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taken over by the Ministry of Education.70 Figures 5 and 6 depicts the financial breakdown of the 
program between the Bangladeshi government and international actors. The government incurred 
most of the program’s costs, and the program made up a significant amount of the education 
budget (Figure 5). Total government expenditure on education remained mostly the same, 
hovering around 2% (Figure 5). All four programs (FSSAP, FSSAP funded by NORAD, FESP, 
SESIP) within the national program were renewed for a five-year period after 2004, with more 
components to improve quality of education.71  
Figure 5: Funding Breakdown of National Stipend Program, 2004 
Source: Simeen Mahmud, “Female Secondary School Stipend Programme in Bangladesh: A Critical 
Assessment.”  
Program FSSAP FSSAP SESIP FESP 
Years Phase 1: 1994-2001 
Phase 2:  
2002-2007 
1994-2000 Phase 1:  
1993-2000 
Phase 2:  
1999- 2006 
1997-2002 
Number of 
Upazilas 
270 118  53 19 
Funding 
Source 
Government of 
Bangladesh 
 
World 
Bank72 
 ADB NORAD 
Funding 
Breakdown 
Phase 1: $85.8 
million of which 
Bangladesh 
government 
contributed 26% 
Phase 2:  
$144.62 of which 
Bangladesh 
government 
proposed share is 
16% 
 Phase 2: $ 86 million 
of which 
Bangladesh 
government 
contributes 30%  
Tk. 6000 lacs 
or NOK 100 
million entirely 
for stipends, no 
Bangladesh 
government 
share 
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71 Deepti Bhatnagar, Magüi Moreno Torres, Parameeta Kanungo and Ankita Dewan. “Empowerment Case Studies: 
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Figure 6: Cost to the Government of Bangladesh, 1997-2000 
Source: Schurmann, Anna T, “Review of the Bangladesh Female Secondary School Stipend Project Using a 
Social Exclusion Framework,” Journal of Health, Population, and Nutrition 27, no. 4 (August 2009): 505–17.   
and https://data.worldbank.org/  
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Expenditure in billions of 
takas 
2.2 3.7 4.0 3.9 
Expenditure as percent of 
Education Development 
Expenditure  
15.0 % 17.7% 16.5% 15.7% 
Government expenditure on 
education, total (% of GDP) 
1.952% n/a 2.133% 2.1% 
 
4.4 Outcomes 
In terms of increasing enrollment of girls in secondary school, the program appears to 
have been very successful. After the program began in 1993, female enrollment at the secondary 
level doubled between 1990 and 1997 to nearly 3 million girls.73 These results are significant 
when considering the statistics before the program. In 1991, only 20% of women in Bangladesh 
were literate, and in secondary school, only 33% of enrolled students and 29% of graduates were 
girls.74 In 2013, the literacy rate for girls ages 15-24 years is around 80%, and secondary school 
enrollment rate for girls reached around 50%.75  
It is difficult to isolate the stipend program from other education programs and reforms 
taking place at that time. Conditional cash transfers, which address the demand side, have 
historically been more effective alongside supply-side reforms. In Bangladesh, the female 
stipend program occurred alongside supply side improvements such as facilities development, 
teacher training and curriculum development, capacity building for academic supervision, and 
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institutional development for monitoring and evaluation.76 Additionally, similar programs, 
including Food for Education program (FFE) took place in 1993 and “incentivized primary 
school attendance for targeted vulnerable households by providing wheat and flour, conditional 
on school attendance.”77 That is why impact assessments were conducted by different social 
scientists and organizations attempting to isolate the stipend’s impact on secondary school 
enrollment for girls. Impact assessments would attempt to isolate the impacts of the program by 
comparing to girls of the same age in urban areas who were ineligible for the program.78 In the 
process, these impact assessments revealed a variety of short and long-term outcomes on 
participants. 
According to Mahmud, impact assessments revealed positive impacts such as increased 
“age at marriage, greater birth spacing, positive attitude to smaller family size, and higher 
employment and earning levels.”79 Additionally, the program appeared to improve some 
“attitudes among community leaders and the general population towards female secondary 
education.”80  Studies of the female stipend program also revealed that “older siblings’ education 
has a significant, and large, impact on younger siblings’ education.”81 It was estimated that for 
each “additional year of schooling undertaken by older siblings, the number of years of 
schooling completed by younger siblings increases by about 0.13 years.”82 A study by 
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Shamsuddin found that exposure to five years of the program led to “one year increase in 
education level completed and an increase in female labor force participation by six percentage 
points.”83 A study by Hahn et. all confirmed that “short-term decline in fertility from remaining 
in school” was sustained in the long-term.84 Participants were “more likely to work in the formal 
sector and less likely in the agricultural or informal sector” and  “married more educated 
husbands who had a better occupation and who were closer in age to their own age.”85 
Additionally, the study found that “the children of eligible women were taller and heavier for 
their age, suggesting that the stipend generated positive intergenerational health effects.”86  
It has also been debated to what extent achieving educational indicators like enrollment 
can be considered a sign of education attainment. This is a recurring argument in the literature 
surrounding Conditional Cash Transfer programs in general. The Female Stipend Program and 
its goals and outcomes have been criticized for focusing on meeting quotas and numbers rather 
than educational or rights-based outcomes.87 For example, enrollment and attendance in school is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for receiving an education. Participants did not seem to 
perform any better in school or on the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) examinations, nor did 
the program cover the cost of tutoring for these exams, which can be difficult to pass.88 Even 
though the program was used in tandem with other projects to improve education quality in 
Bangladesh, including the recruitment of additional teachers, some authors criticized the 
program for not doing enough to improve education quality.89   
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It is unclear if the stipend program eliminated the phenomena of son-bias in education. 
Evidence from Asadullah and Chaudhury suggest that even if the gender gap has reversed in 
Bangladesh, the “pass-rate of females in secondary school certificate (SSC) exams is lower 
relative to boys, particularly in rural areas” and that numeracy and literacy skills revealed a 
gender bias against girls.90 Findings in rural Bangladesh revealed that decisions about girls’ 
education were still strictly controlled by fathers, and that mothers were largely excluded from 
education decisions regarding their children.91  
Most importantly though, the program was criticized for failing to sufficiently help girls 
in underserved areas. The stipend amount was the same for everyone and did not increase if girls 
came from poorer backgrounds. A study by Behrman found that a family with lower 
socioeconomic status led to a “decreased probability of stipend participation.” She suggests that 
this is because higher socioeconomic status families “have different preferences about children’s 
schooling or are better at navigating the school system and gaining access to stipends.”92 She 
concludes that stipend programs “can improve absolute schooling for populations while failing to 
reduce relative achievement gaps between children of different socioeconomic backgrounds.”93  
Having a program apply without any targeting other than meeting the conditions also meant that 
because some families may have been receiving the stipend even if they would have sent their 
girls to school without it. The different perspectives on targeting became very clear as discussion 
turned to the future of the program from the involved actors.    
4.5 Analysis of Involved Political Actors 
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The arrangement between domestic and international actors created some tension on the 
topic of targeting and future programs. During discussions of renewal, international donors 
sought results or evidence of changing behavior, and therefore strove for more specific targeting, 
while the government wanted to promote wider coverage and access.94 Donors were reluctant to 
increase stipend amounts for the very poorest, unless the universal aspect of the stipend was 
withdrawn to focus on the neediest. Meanwhile, the government, who provided 60% of the 
funding, was opposed to more stringent targeting.95 The lack of targeting made the program 
extremely expensive, costing 15% of the secondary education budget and 6% of the total 
education budget.96 Other CCT programs have more stringent targeting mechanisms to maximize 
efficiency. Authors like Schurmann argue that the Government of Bangladesh wanted to keep the 
program untargeted for the “popularity and electoral support it provided.”97  
Once gender parity was achieved, subsequent programs have focused on targeting the 
poorest boys and girls and providing them with stipends and tuition coverage. This program was 
known as the Secondary Education Quality and Access Enhancement Project (SEQAEP) and it 
was launched in 2008 with the support of the International Development Association (IDA).98 To 
address the concerns of previous programs, these new programs have “quality-enhancing” 
incentives and proxy means testing-targeting rather than universal coverage.99 It would appear 
that donors’ push for stringent targeting, the expenses of running a national program, and the 
achievement of  gender parity forced the program and the Government of Bangladesh to adopt 
more stringent targeting.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
After its scaling up to a national program in 1993, the Female Stipend Program is credited 
with the dynamic improvements in the enrollment of girls in secondary school in Bangladesh that 
have occurred since the 1990s. Adolescent girl’s attendance in secondary school was prioritized 
due to the unique cultural practices and income barriers that put them at a disadvantage for 
receiving an education.  In addition to the increase in enrollment, other positive short and long-
term outcomes were observed in impact reports, including increased age at marriage and birth 
spacing, improvements in family health and impacts on employment and earning level. Debates 
about future programs and targeting revealed tensions between political actors, but eventually,  
gender parity in education was achieved, and on average, girls are now attending school at 
slightly higher rates than boys.  
 
5 Case Study: Pakistan 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSS) was implemented in the Punjab province 
in 2004 and successfully increased secondary school enrollment for girls. Impact reports also 
revealed improvements in short and long-term indicators, such as drop-out rates, enrollment 
rates, later earning and consumption habits, and age of marriage.100 This case study will cover 
the program’s origins, design, and outcomes, in order to analyze the program’s successes and 
shortcomings.  
5.2 Origins 
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The stipend was implemented as part of the Punjab Education Sector Reform Programme 
(PESRP) undertaken by the Provincial Government of Punjab and development partners in 
2004.101 The reforms themselves had three strategic pillars: “public finance reforms to realign 
expenditures at the provincial and district level toward education and other pro-poor 
expenditures; devolution and public sector management reforms; and education sector reforms to 
improve quality, access, and governance of the education system.”102 These reforms introduced 
the female secondary cash transfer program alongside improvements to the supply side, 
including free textbook programs, the hiring of 50, 000 teachers, the establishment of 
“community-based school councils,” and the establishment of a performance- based monitoring 
system.103 Around 30, 000 schools received additional class rooms and toilets, and the reforms 
provided financing for 300 private schools to support students from lower income families.104 
The Punjab province was the first to undergo education reforms and was chosen because of 
its size.105 Out of the four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), 
Punjab is the most populous, comprising almost 60% of the total population of Pakistan, and 
produces 57% of Pakistan’s GDP.106 In Pakistan, responsibility over public education is largely 
devolved to the provincial level.107 In 2000, Pakistan introduced devolution reforms that gave 
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district governments the responsibility to deliver basic education.108 Much of the PESRP 
program fell under the personal oversight of the Chief Minister of the province of Punjab.109 In 
2011, the then-Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif made “unprecedented” political investments into 
the program, personally leading “stock take meetings to review the performance of districts and 
the School Education Department against pre-aligned goals and targets.”110 At the primary level, 
both public and private schools are better funded, making them more affordable and 
accessible.111 However, secondary education in Pakistan is made up of mostly public schools, 
and not every village has access to middle schools (grades 6 to 8) or secondary schools (grades 9 
and 10).112 This is particularly detrimental to girls, who are even less likely to attend schools 
farther away due to safety concerns.113 In 1992, less than a quarter of girls in Pakistan were 
enrolled in secondary school nationally (Figure 7).  
Figure 7: Secondary School Gross Enrollment Before and After Stipend114 
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files, The World 
Bank Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/  
 1992 2006 
Girls 18.73% 28.02% 
Boys 37.43% 36.08% 
Girls in Pakistan face many similar obstacles to receiving an education as girls in many 
other developing countries. The most significant barriers, however, are poverty and cultural 
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practices. Studies have shown that impoverished households are even less likely to send girls to 
school compared to their male siblings.115 Girls provide more “child labor inputs to the 
household’s economic activities and domestic chores,” and thus poor households are more likely 
to rely on girls’ labor.116 Patriarchal values also factor into this gender gap in education; women 
are frequently restricted to the private sphere, married at a young age, or face mobility 
restrictions, which all create barriers to girls’ secondary education.117 Due to this direct 
relationship between parental income and girl’s enrollment in school, conditional cash transfers 
have become a popular development strategy because they ease the financial deterrents 
associated with girls’ education and positively incentivize investments in girls’ education.  
5.2 Program Design 
The Punjab Female School Stipend (FSSS) provides eligible students in grades 6- 8 600 
Pakistani rupees (roughly 10 USD) quarterly if they attended a minimum of 80% of school 
days.118 Recipients were selected based on sixteen districts in Punjab with the lowest literacy 
rates.119 Females were eligible for the stipend only if they attend public secondary schools, 
demonstrating the public focus of the reform agenda.”120 The districts chosen were 
Bahawalnagar, Bahwalpur, Bhakkar, Chinniot, Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Kasur, Khanewal, 
Layyah, Lodhran, Muzaffargarh, Okara, Pakpattan, Rajanpur, Rahim Yar Khan and Vehari, 
which are located in the south of the province (Figure 8).121 In 2006, the program was expanded 
                                                 
115 Ibid, 67-92. 
116 Ibid, 67-92. 
117 Rashid Menhas et al., “Cultural Barriers of Female Empowerment,” Afro Asian Journal of Anthropology and 
Social Policy 4, (2013):  https://doi.org/10.5958/j.2229-4414.4.1.001. 
118 Andaleeb Alam, Javier Baez, and Ximena Del Carpio,  
119Andaleeb Alam, Javier Baez, and Ximena Del Carpio.  
120 Ibid.,  
121 Department of School Education, Government of Punjab, “Distribution of Stipend to Girl Students,” Punjab 
Education Sector Reform Programme, Pakistan, 2016. http://www.pesrp.edu.pk/pages/Stipend-to-Girl.   
Gibbons 30 
 
to girls in grades 9 and 10.122 Schools in stipend districts are required to keep records of class 
attendance and every quarter, the list of all eligible students is submitted to the Executive District 
Office for Education (EDO).123 Stipend requests are then sent to the Program Monitoring and 
Implementation Unit (PMIU), the EDO receives and transfers the stipend to post offices or 
through the schools to the households of the girls.124 The process takes about 10-14 weeks, and 
recipients sign a receipt to acknowledge they received the payment.125  
Figure 8: Geographical Coverage of the Stipend Program  
Source: IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2011.” Do Conditional Cash Transfers Lead to Medium-Term 
Impacts?: Evidence from a Female School Stipend Program in Pakistan.” Washington, DC: World Bank.  
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By 2007, the stipend program had reached 245,000 middle school beneficiaries.126 An 
expansion of the PESRP, called the Second Punjab Education Sector Reform Program (PESRP 
II), was launched in 2012.127  The program is currently ongoing, and the PESRP website 
describes the program’s goals as “improving enrollment, increasing retention, reducing gender 
disparities and enhancing female prestige.”128 From 2013-2014, the program boasted 411,000 
recipients from grades 8-10, with the same condition of 80% attendance.129  
5.4 Outcomes 
The program was largely successful at achieving its goals. An impact report from 2006 
revealed that female middle school enrollment rate in the provinces increased from 43% 
(baseline 2003) to 53% in 2005.130 It was found that girls who received the stipends were more 
likely to complete middle school and high school.131 The female dropout rates between grade 5 
and 6 decreased by 25% and by 20% for middle school.132 Additionally, child labor seems to 
have been affected by the stipend. Girls’ participation in unpaid family work fell, and labor force 
participation of adolescent girls in stipend districts fell by 4–5 percentage points compared to 
those in non-stipend areas.133 Girls in stipend districts were able to delay marriage on average by 
1.4 years and have 0.3 fewer children (marginally significant in a statistical sense).134 While the 
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program was renewed, the only available impact reports come from 2006-2009, and do not cover 
the PSERP II, the program’s renewal that began in 2012. More impact reports must be 
completed, to fully understand the other short and long-term effects of the program.  
Some authors have said that the program’s costs outweigh its benefits, because “the 
stipend cannot distinguish between children who would be going to school anyway, or children 
who change their decision as a result of the stipend, or children who would not go to school with 
or without the stipend.”135 This could be a result of the targeting, which was limited to girls in 
districts with low literacy rates, but did not measure who would be going to school without the 
incentive.  A few inconsistencies in the program’s implementation have also been reported. In 
some of the provinces, there was confusion about the criteria for the program. In Bahawalpur, it 
was reported that parents were unaware of the requirements for receiving the stipend, and it has 
been recommended that the local administration make more of an effort to raise awareness of the 
program.136 In another province, Rahim Yar Khan, ATM cards for stipend participants were 
under issued, leaving many without their stipend program.137  
Additionally, impact assessments of the FSSS revealed that parents responded to the 
program by sending their sons to private primary schools.138 Studies have also shown that even 
in rich families, where income is not a deterrent to girls’ education, parents in Pakistan prefer to 
send their daughters to public school over private.139 The number of private schools in Punjab 
has increased since the beginning of the stipend program. In 2003 before the stipend program, 
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there were around 19, 000 private schools.140 In 2002, forty-four thousand government primary 
schools, seven thousand government middle schools, four to five thousand government high 
schools, and five hundred higher secondary schools.141 In latest estimates of the Punjab province, 
there are approximately 60,000 government schools and 35,000 private schools.142 Fees in 
private schools are often low and below cost of the FSSS stipend.143 Children who study in 
private schools score substantially higher in tests in all subjects and receive a better quality 
education.144 This evidence would suggest that girls continue to be at disadvantage when they 
compete with male siblings for resources towards their education. Further assessments of the 
stipend program should take this trend into account, as it calls into question the quality of 
education received by girls compared to their male counterparts, potentially widening the gender 
gap in education in a different way. One of the most important policies of the Punjab education 
reforms was the Private School Census in 2016-17 to evaluate the growth and impact of private 
schools.145 There has been explosive growth of “self-owned, nonreligious, for-profit private 
schools” in Punjab since the 1990s, which has been described as “decentralized and market 
based.”146 Gathering information on the impact of private schools is a crucial first step in 
achieving some level of standardization.  
5.5 Analysis of Involved Political Actors 
The stipend program and broader education reforms in Punjab are significantly 
influenced by domestic and international politics. Education reform programs in Punjab are 
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supported by two international donors, the World Bank and the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID). Figure 9 depicts the breakdown of Phase II funding found in 
a World Bank report from 2015 and shows how the program continues to be funded by a 
combination of donors and the Pakistani government. The DFID and the Bank have also 
provided “technical and professional assistance” and participate in a bimonthly conference with 
the Chief Minister Punjab, heads of Education Departments, and Finance, Planning and 
Development Departments, to monitor the program’s progress.147 The PESRP reforms have been 
described by the World Bank as having a “country-wide” impact, with the Government of 
Pakistan acknowledging the Bank’s positive role and requesting “similar programmatic support 
for other provinces of the country.”148 
Figure 9: Financing of PESRP II  
Source:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/282311468083333884/pdf/875500REVISED000Meetings02014000May.pdf 
 
                                                 
147 Umair Javed, and Salman Naveed, Punjab Wins, Losses and Challenges for the Future 2018-2023. Islamabad: 
Alif Ailaan, 2018. 
148 World Bank, “Pakistan: Punjab Education Sector Reform Program (PESRP).” 
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 This level of international involvement is likely because of Pakistan’s difficulties in 
reaching its Millennium Development Goals as well as its economic struggles. The UK’s 
Department for International Development website justifies its support of development projects 
in Pakistan for the sake of “millions of poor Pakistanis, and the stability and security of both the 
region and the UK.”149 While highlighting Pakistan’s high levels of poverty and inequality, high 
risk of natural disasters, and extremism and militancy, the department claims to support the 
growth of democracy and government institutions.150 Additionally, the countries have a notable 
relationship; Pakistan is also a former British colony and the United Kingdom is home to a 
sizable population of British Pakistanis. Foreign aid towards Pakistan is also typically associated 
with the strategic significance of the country and the security concerns of the United States and 
its allies. The United Kingdom was among the countries that invaded Afghanistan alongside the 
United States in 2001. Exact figures of total multilateral and bilateral aid to Pakistan come from 
a variety of sources are often contradictory and vague. This international security interest in 
Pakistan, especially when considering the dominance of the Pakistani military on society and 
politics, makes transparency, accountability, and monitoring an important part of the donor 
process, to make sure that funding goes directly to development projects.  
5.6 Conclusion 
 Punjab’s Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSS) was successful increasing the 
enrollment rate of girls at the secondary school level. Other positive externalities were also 
observed, including marriage and birth delays, and positive impacts on later consumption and 
earning levels. These is significant room for further study; targeting districts may need to be 
                                                 
149 Department for International Development, “DFID Pakistan.” https://www.gov.uk/world/organisations/dfid-
pakistan.  
150 Ibid.,  
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adjusted, and impact reports of the stipend on high school beneficiaries are needed. Another 
interesting factor is the relationship between girls and parental decisions for private versus public 
schooling. If this trend of sending boys to private school over girls continues, the gender gap in 
education would decrease, but the quality of education could potentially increase. Studying the 
impact of private schooling on gender and investing in more in education on a national scale 
would help maximize the benefits of the cash transfers and help Pakistan achieve its global 
development and constitutional education commitments.  
The purpose of this section of the paper is to compare the Female Stipend Program (FSP) in 
Bangladesh and the Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSS) in Pakistan, in order to determine 
why the Bangladesh program was so successful, and what lessons about CCTs in South Asia 
could be drawn from comparing the programs. First, outcomes are compared, in order to 
determine how the programs differed. Finally, four factors- program design, education system 
differences, political factors, and economic factors- were analyzed in order to determine why the 
programs had different outcomes.   
6.1 Outcomes Analysis 
Figure 10: Bangladesh, Secondary School Enrollment,  
Before and After Stipend, and Most Recent 
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files, The World Bank 
Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/  
 1990  1998  2016 
Girls  13.67% 42.18% 72.49% 
Boys 26.8% s 44.88% 65.61% 
 
Figure 11: Pakistan, Secondary School Enrollment,  
Before and After Stipend, and Most Recent 
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files, The World Bank 
Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/  
 1992 2006 2016 
Girls 18.73% 28.02% 41.116% 
Boys 37.43% 36.08% 50.72% 
Gibbons 37 
 
In terms of outcomes, the stipend program had a larger impact on Bangladesh. Girls’ 
enrollment increased at a much larger rate, from 13.67% in 1990 to 42.18% in 1998 (Figure 10). 
In Pakistan, the stipend program increased female secondary school enrollment rate in the Punjab 
province increased from 43% before the program to 53% in 2005.151 National female secondary 
school enrollment rate increased from 1992 to 2006 by about 10% and is about 41% today 
(Figure 11). It was difficult to find enrollment statistics for both countries, as both had several 
years missing from the data available.  
 While the gross enrollment rates for Pakistan were missing from World Bank database 
for the years between 1992 and 2006, Pakistan’s national and regional progress were found using 
the Gender Parity Index for secondary education (Figure 12).152 The GPI for Pakistan has 
increased overtime but appears to have fluctuated, from 0.75 in 2001/02 before the stipend 
program, to 0.81 in 2011/12. Punjab has the highest GPI compared to other regions but has 
experienced fluctuations in reaching a higher GPI. For example, the GPI increased after 2004/05 
after the program began, but decreased in 2007/08, increased, and then decreased again in 
2011/12. To compare, Bangladesh has been able to achieve and maintain gender parity (Figure 
13).  
Figure 12: Gender Parity Index, Secondary School, Pakistan 
Source: Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform Government, “Pakistan Millennium 
Development Goals Report 2013,” Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2013,  
http://www.pk.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/MDGs/MDG2013Report/final%20report.pdf. 
Region 2001/02 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2007/08 2008/09 2010/11 2011/12 
Pakistan 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.85 0.81 
Punjab 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.88 0.94 0.91 0.97 0.85 
Sindh 0.68 0.74 0.83 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.79 0.84 
                                                 
151 Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, Vishwanath, and Zajonc. “Pakistan: Learning and Educational Achievements in Punjab 
Schools (LEAPS): Insights to inform the education policy debate.” Learning and Educational Achievement in 
Punjab Schools (LEAPS) Report, 2007.  
152 The index refers to the ratio of females to males enrolled in schools and is measured using net enrollment of 
students in the class level of 6-10.   
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KP 0.45 0.53 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.59 
Balochistan 0.43 0.63 0.63 0.57 0.58 0.50 041 0.41 
  
Figure 13: Gender Parity Index, Secondary School, Bangladesh 
Source: General Economics Division (GED) Bangladesh Planning. “Bangladesh Progress Report 
2015” Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, September 2015. 
Year 1991 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 
GPI  0.52 0.82 1.06 1.04 1.14 1.13 
 
Overall, both countries have seen an increase in enrollment for both genders, likely 
because of the investments in education since the 1990s. Both programs had positive short and 
long-term interests (Figure 14).  
Figure 14: Outcomes Comparison, Bangladesh and Pakistan 
 Bangladesh’s FSP Pakistan’s FSSS 
Short-
term 
In 1990, the gross national secondary school enrollment 
for girls was 13.67%, compared to 26.8% for boys. 
After the program began in 1993, female enrollment 
at the secondary level doubled between 1990 and 
1997 to nearly 3 million girls. 
In 1991, only 20% of women in Bangladesh were 
literate, and in secondary school, only 33% of 
enrolled students and 29% of graduates were girls. 
 In 2013, the literacy rate for women ages 15-24 years 
is around 80%. 
In 2016, gross national secondary school enrollment 
was 72.49% for girls and 65.61% for boys. 
 
LEAPS: Female secondary school 
enrollment rate in the province increased 
from 43% (baseline 2003) to 53% in 2005.  
Andaleeb Alam, Javier Baez, and 
Ximena Del Carpio: Girls who received the 
stipends were more likely to complete 
middle school and high school. 
Female dropout rates between grade 5 and 6 
decreased by 25% and by 20% for middle 
school 
Girls’ participation in unpaid family work 
fell, and labor force participation of 
adolescent girls in stipend districts fell by 
4–5% 
Long-
term  
Mahmud: 
 Increased age at marriage, greater birth spacing, 
positive attitude to smaller family size, and higher 
employment and earning levels.  
The program appeared to improve some attitudes 
among community leaders and the general population 
towards female secondary education. 
Lutfunnahar Begum, Asad Islam, and Russell 
Smyth:  
For each additional year of schooling undertaken by 
older siblings, the number of years of schooling 
completed by younger siblings increases by about 
0.13 years. 
Shamsuddin:  
Exposure to five years of the program led to “one-year 
increase in education level completed and an increase 
in female labor force participation by six percentage 
LEAPS: Girls in stipend districts were able 
to delay marriage on average by 1.4 years 
and have 0.3 fewer children (marginally 
significant in a statistical sense). 
Andaleeb Alam, Javier Baez, and Ximena 
Del Carpio: Parents responded to the 
program by sending their sons to private 
primary schools. 
National enrollment of girls in secondary 
school increased by about 10%.  
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points. It also found that wages decrease by about 
17% because the women have difficulties in finding a 
good job and end up in low productivity self-
employment work. 
Hahn et. all:  
Short-term decline in fertility from remaining in 
school was sustained in the long-term. 
Participants were “more likely to work in the formal 
sector and less likely in the agricultural or informal 
sector” and “married more educated husbands who 
had a better occupation and who were closer in age to 
their own age.” 
“the children of eligible women were taller and 
heavier for their age, suggesting that the stipend 
generated positive intergenerational health effects.” 
 
MDGs Bangladesh surpassed MDG 3, Target 3.1: Eliminate 
gender disparity in primary and secondary school 
 
Pakistan unable to meet MDG 3 
 
It is important to keep in mind that the program in Pakistan occurred much more recently. 
Bangladesh’s program began in 1993, twenty-five years ago, and Pakistan’s began in 2003, 
fifteen years ago. Pakistan’s program is also still on-going according to the PSERP website. The 
complete impact of the program, therefore, is unknown, and it is possible that Pakistan could see 
larger gains in secondary enrollment for girls as time goes by. Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s 
program has been replaced with a stipend program as a part of the Secondary Education Quality 
and Access Enhancement Project (SEQAEP) since 2008 and targets both underprivileged boys 
and girls.  
The biggest takeaway is that both programs raised girls’ enrollment in secondary school. 
These results are highly consistent with the existing literature on conditional cash transfers. 
CCTs perform best at improving quantitative indicators for health and education. For example, 
enrollment in secondary school is a quantitative indicator that is often used in development 
statistics. CCTs do not necessary improve the quality of health or education, and enrollment 
statistics do not show the varying quality of education that children are receiving.    
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6.2 Analysis of Factors 
This section of the paper analyzes the programmatic, systemic, political, and economic factors 
that may have contributed to the end of the gender gap in Bangladesh.  
6.2.1 Factor 1: Programmatic Differences 
According to the literature, the success of a stipend program heavily depends on 
calibrating the right conditions and targeting. Bangladesh’s program featured much more 
stringent conditions, meanwhile Pakistan’s program only required 80% attendance of school 
days in order to receive the stipend (Figure 15). Girls’ stipends in Bangladesh increased with 
grades, providing increasing incentive for staying in school and discouraging dropping out. It 
also required that they stay unmarried. Pakistan’s program only required attendance of 80% of 
school days, did not have the marriage condition, and the stipend amount was the same for all 
grades. Additionally, girls had to receive at least 45% on their exams in Bangladesh. Perhaps one 
of the reasons Bangladesh saw more success in girls’ secondary school enrollment could be the 
more stringent conditions of its CCT. While the FSP required slightly less attendance, the 
program was more committed to other factors that might affect parents’ decisions to send girls to 
secondary school, such as marriage.  
Figure 15: Program Design Comparisons 
 Bangladesh’s FSP Pakistan’s FSSS 
Conditions Conditional on 75% attendance of the 
school year, at least 45% marks on 
exams, and remaining unmarried 
Must attend a minimum of 80% 
of school days 
Targeting Female students enrolled in 
recognized institutions in rural 
upazilas where the program was 
taking place (covered 460 of the 
some 492 upazilas in Bangladesh) 
Female students in sixteen 
districts in Punjab with the lowest 
literacy rates. Grades 6- 8 in 
2004, expanded to grades 9 and 
10 in 2006 
Stipend Amount  Girl’s tuition fees and a monthly 
stipend, increased with grade 
600 Pakistani rupees (roughly 10 
USD) quarterly  
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Girls Reached at 
Peak 
In 2002, the program reached 
4,193,352 girls. The amount 
decreased after  
By 2007, the stipend program had 
reached 245,000. By 2013, the 
program reached 411,000.  
Cost In 2000, the program cost the 
government of Bangladesh 3.9 billion 
takas.  
The government of Pakistan 
provided US$ 3,387.7 million to 
PESRP II in 2012.  
 
The two programs also had a completely different scope. The stipend program in Bangladesh 
was on a national scale, while the program in Pakistan was only implemented in the Punjab 
province. This is reflected in the number of girls reached and the cost of the programs. 
Bangladesh was able to reach millions of girls, but also spent several billion takas, or 
$46,591,077 USD. The Punjab Education Reforms cost $3, 387.7 million USD, but it was 
unclear how much of that reform budget was spent on the cash transfer program. CCTs often 
focus on making targeting most efficient, in order to minimize program costs and only reach 
households that would not be incentivized without the stipend. However, targeting is difficult 
and expensive to measure, sometimes done with proxy means testing or household surveys. 
Neither of these programs in South Asia relied on these sorts of targeting, and instead made the 
assumption that girls in lower literacy rates or rural upazilas faced collective economic and 
cultural barriers to education from their households and chose to target the stipends to these 
populations. Stipend amount may have also played a role in Bangladesh’s success. The FSP gave 
smaller, more frequent monthly stipends that increased with girls’ age, while Pakistan’s FSSS 
gave larger amounts quarterly that did not change. Across CCT literature, there is no universal 
amount recommended for programs to be effective, just that it must be enough to overcome a 
household’s opportunity costs to conform the program’s requirements. It is possible that scaling 
up the stipend amount as girls continued in school provided additional incentive that contributed 
to Bangladesh’s progress. Both programs targeted girls in secondary school and incentivized 
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enrollment rates with stipend payments, but there were also crucial programmatic design 
differences that may have impacted the programs’ success. With the current data available, it is 
impossible to say whether one program design aspect made more of difference or not, however, 
future research could to try and isolate program design aspects to find this answer. Pakistan 
might draw some lessons from Bangladesh’s program, particularly in terms of targeting and 
stipend amount, which will be discussed in the recommendations section.  
6.2.2 Factor 2:  Differences in Educational Systems   
By comparing the education systems of both countries, this section seeks to observe whether 
Bangladesh’s program performed better due to factors regarding their education system. From 
what information was available from the World Bank, the governments of Bangladesh and 
Pakistan spend comparable amounts of their GDP on Education, although Pakistan spends 
slightly more (Figure 16). The governments of Pakistan and Bangladesh spend less on education 
compared to the rest of the region of South Asia, and Bangladesh has a slightly higher HDI value 
than Pakistan (Figure 17).  
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Figure 17: Human Development Indicators and Percentage (%) of 
GDP spent on Education for South Asia Countries 
Sources: http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries  
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.7  
Country  HDI 
Ranking 2018 
HDI Value 
2018 
 GDP 
Spent, 
2009 
GSP 
Spent, 
2013 
Afghanistan 168 0.498 n/a  3.5% 
Bangladesh 136 0.608 1.9% 2.0% 
Bhutan 134 0.612 4.6% 5.6% 
India 130 0.640 3.3% 3.8% 
Maldives 101 0.717 5.8% 3.8% 
Nepal 149 0.574 4.7% 3.5% 
Pakistan 150 0.562 2.6% 2.5% 
Sri Lanka 76 0.770 2.1% 1.6% 
 
From these statistics, one might be tempted to conclude that education in Bangladesh and 
Pakistan are fairly comparable; their governments spend similar amounts on education and both 
struggle with reaching complete secondary school enrollment. However, upon closer 
examination, the education systems of Pakistan and Bangladesh are very different. Unlike 
Bangladesh, where the public education system is highly centralized, Pakistan has devolved 
responsibility over public education to the provincial level.153  
In 2010, Pakistan added an 18th amendment to its Constitution, and Article 25a of that 
amendment called for free and compulsory education for all children aged 5–16 years 
old.154  Despite this lofty commitment, Pakistan has been unable to deliver on its educational 
promises. Education governance in Pakistan lacks stability and consistency. Provincializing 
education led to the abolition of the federal Ministry of Education (MoE).155 The same 18th 
                                                 
153 Nazmul Chaudhury and Dilip Parajuli, “Conditional Cash Transfers and Female Schooling: The Impact of the 
Female School Stipend Program on Public School Enrollments in Punjab, Pakistan,” The World Bank, December 1, 
2006. https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4102. 
154 Allah Bakhsh Malik, “Policy Analysis of Education in Punjab Province,” UNESCO, November 2011, 
http://unesco.org.pk/education/documents/situationanalysis/Education_Policy_Analysis_for_Punjab.pdf.  
155 Mehnaz Aziz David E. Bloom Salal Humair Emmanuel Jimenez Larry Rosenberg Zeba Sathar, “Education 
System Reform in Pakistan: Why, When, and How?” IZA Policy Paper No. 76, January 2014, 22.  
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amendment was wrought with controversy and devolving education to the provincial level was 
challenges by the Supreme Court in November 2011.156 The government then took an existing 
ministry, the Ministry of Professional Education and Trainings, and turned it into the Ministry of 
Education and Training (MoET).157 Not only did this create a great deal of instability in 
education policymaking, but the MoET lacks clear roles, responsibilities, and authority, 
especially in relation to provincial ministries of education.158  
Education reform on the national level has also been highly inconsistent across sectors 
and beholden to political whims. Education reforms on the national level prior to 2000 were 
“overwhelmingly marginalized in favor of primary education” at the behest of donors.159 The 
Higher Education Commission (HEC), created in 2002, attempted to alleviate the sector 
differences, but have faced a reduced budget and pressure to investigate “degrees of sitting 
parliamentarians” by the Supreme Court, leaving it with few political allies.160 It is unclear 
whether the HEC or the MoET are responsible for higher education in Pakistan.  
The limitations of the education system in Pakistan might also be attributed to how the 
government spends its education budget. Currently, the government of Pakistan spends 2.4% of 
its GDP on education, with 89% of this budget used towards teacher’s salaries and 11% towards 
development.161 To compare, around the time of Bangladesh’s stipend program, the development 
budget was 58% of the education sector.162 Corruption and transparency are also a factor in the 
case of Pakistan’s education system. According to an article by The Economist published this 
                                                 
156 Ibid., 22.  
157 Ibid., 22-23. 
158 Ibid., 23 
159 Ibid., 24. 
160 Ibid., 24. 
161 Aftab Hussain, “Education System of Pakistan: Issues, Problems and Solutions.” Islamabad Policy Research 
Institute, March 2, 2015.  http://www.ipripak.org/education-system-of-pakistan-issues-problems-and-solutions/.  
162 UNESCO-IBE, “Bangladesh,” World Data on Education, 2006.  
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year, Pakistan’s political parties have used teaching jobs “as a way of recruiting election workers 
and rewarding allies,” with some pocketing the salary and not turning up to classes.163 There are 
concerns about the credibility of enrolment statistics and lack of transparency from the provincial 
minister’s quarterly meetings.164  
Due to the provincialization of Pakistan, using national statistics for education funding 
and statistics can be misleading, because it is difficult to depict the differences in education 
indicators across provinces, and differences in education quality can skew national statistics. The 
most recent data that could be found for provincial education statistics were literacy rates across 
provinces from 2014 (Figure 18). While gender specific literacy rates for the provinces were 
unavailable, it is clear that literacy rates are higher in Punjab compared to the rest of the country.  
Figure 18: Literacy Rates in Pakistan by Province 
Source: Abdul Rehman, Luan Jingdong, and Imran Hussain, “The Province-Wise Literacy Rate in Pakistan and 
Its Impact on the Economy,” Pacific Science Review B: Humanities and Social Sciences 1, no. 3 (November 
2015): 140–44, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psrb.2016.09.001. 
Year Punjab Sindh Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Balochistan 
1972 20.07% 30.20% 15.50% 10.10% 
1998 46.60% 45.30% 35.40%, 26.60% 
2010 71% 69% 60% 50% 
2013 62% 60% 52% 44% 
2014 61% 56% 53%. 43% 
Pakistan encompasses several ethnic groups with none holding a clear majority, and 
unifies the country through Islam, a common language in Urdu, and a federalist government 
structure (Figure 19). After the secession of Bangladesh, Pakistan’s Constitution was rewritten in 
1973 with a bicameral legislature that gave Punjab, the most populous province, the most seats in 
the National Assembly.165 These circumstances gave Punjab a financial and political advantage 
                                                 
163 “School reform: Pakistan is home to the most frenetic education reforms in the world.” The Economist, January 
4, 2018. https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/01/04/pakistan-is-home-to-the-most-frenetic-education-reforms-
in-the-world.   
164 Ibid.  
165 Ibid., 539–565.  
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over the other provinces. Any political party seeking to come to power in Pakistan has to be 
mindful of the Punjab vote, and this has led to some tension with other provinces.166 For 
example, despite the fact that Punjab is more urbanized and wealthier than other provinces, it 
frequently receives the highest allocation of national resources because of its size and political 
influence.167 This has led for calls by other provinces to create a Seraiki province in Southern 
Punjab, an area that is much less developed than the rest of the province and is linguistically 
distinct. 168 The female stipend program targeted the districts in Punjab with the lowest literacy 
rates, which happened to be all clustered in the south (Figure 9). These political factors provide 
some insight into why the Punjab education reforms took place, and why the stipend program 
occurred in certain districts of Punjab.  
 Figure 19: Ethnic Breakdown of Pakistan 
Source:  The World Factbook 2013-14, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013. 
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To truly address Pakistan’s difficulties in reaching national education goals, the government 
be clearer about who is responsible for education reforms, and reforms and funding must be 
spread more equitably across the country. Efforts to replicate the female stipend program in other 
provinces have been met with mixed results. In the Sindh province, newspapers reported that 
Larkana district students did not receive their stipend in 2013 after the program launched for 
“unknown reasons.”169 The FSSS and Punjab’s education reforms have been beneficial for 
Punjab, and because of its size, may have driven up the country’s enrollment rates, but it can 
only do so much for education in the county as a whole.   
Studies of Pakistan’s stipend program revealed that parents responded to the program by 
sending their sons to private primary schools, while daughters remained in public school. Around 
63% of middle schools (grades 6-8) in Pakistan and around 66% of secondary schools are private 
schools (grades 9-10).170 According to the National Education Policy Report published in 2017, 
most of the country’s private schools are for male children only.171 Some of Pakistan’s madrasas 
have been accused in some regions of the country of perpetuating extremism.172 Meanwhile in 
Bangladesh, since private schools make up over 95% of the country’s secondary schools, parents 
did not have the ability to send their female children to a public school and their sons to private 
school. Private schools in Bangladesh also became coeducational around the time of the stipend. 
A study by Asadullah and Chaudhury found that the rise of NGO-funded primary schools 
directly contributed to an increase in enrollments in religious secondary schools to cater to these 
                                                 
169 “Girl Students Deprived of Annual Stipend,” Daily Regional Times, October 21, 2013. 
170 Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training, “National Education Policy 2017,” Government of 
Pakistan, 2017. http://www.moent.gov.pk/userfiles1/file/National%20Educaiton%20Policy%202017.pdf. 
171 Ibid., 110.  
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new primary school students.173 Registered madrasas saw a higher growth in enrolment of girls 
in secondary grades during 1999–2003, and schools that switched from male to coed also 
experienced higher enrolment growth.174 Madrasas located in areas with a larger number of 
BRAC schools saw a higher growth in female enrolment.175 Additionally, a report published by 
the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs in 2016 found that the proportion of 
madrasa students that were female increased from 7.7 percent in 1990 to 52 percent in 2008.176 
These results indicate that the coeducation in private, religious education played an important 
role in ending the gender gap in Bangladesh. Pakistan seems to lack the pressure of NGO schools 
that Bangladesh experienced.  
The benefit of the privatization of schools in Pakistan is also unclear. Michael Barber, 
DFID’s Pakistan Education Task Force Co-chair, has described that overall, Pakistani education 
system as very poor, citing how 60% of schools have no electricity and 34 % are without 
drinking water.1 He posits that low-cost private education “delivers better performance than the 
public schools at less than half the unit cost.”2 Other authors have argued that low-income 
private schools exacerbate inequities and argue in favor of a stronger public school system.3 As 
part of the Punjab education reforms, a greater effort has been made to reach public-private 
partnership in education and provide public financing of private schools.4 The relationship 
between girls’ education and public versus private school in these two countries, as well as the 
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nature of the Pakistani education system, could be one explanation for why Bangladesh 
experienced a higher level of success in ending the gender gap compared to Pakistan’s FSSS.  
6.2.3 Factor 3: Political Analysis 
Bangladesh seems to have more political will towards development than Pakistan. This can 
be seen at the surface level, where it has a higher HDI ranking and higher life expectancies than 
other South Asian countries. Analysis of the political actors within Bangladesh revealed that 
grassroots organizing has played a key role in development since the country’s independence.  
NGOs in Bangladesh 
The presence of NGOs has since the creation of Bangladesh has created stronger mechanisms 
for accountability in development. After the 1971 War of Independence, Bangladesh experienced 
serious poverty, famine, and hunger, and foreign donors became attracted to supporting “certain 
rudimentary forms of NGO at the grassroots level to alleviate alarming conditions in 
Bangladesh.”177 For example, one of the world’s largest NGOs, Bangladesh Rehabilitation 
Assistance Committee (BRAC), was founded around this time to provide “relief and 
rehabilitation” to the displaced.178 Bangladesh then experienced periods of authoritarianism and 
military rule from 1975 and 1990 during which martial law was declared, the constitution 
suspended, and political parties disbanded.179 During this time, NGOs actually “expanded 
considerably,” and were supported by the regime  
“to enhance its legitimacy at the grassroots level, coopt and use large NGOS as 
substitutes for opposition political parties and, more importantly, respond to the emerging 
global trend toward greater NGO power since the early 1980s.”180 
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It has been argued that the military government attempted to project modernization to increase 
donor funding and selected women’s rights issues to achieve this end.181 This is evinced by 
actions by the military government of Ziaur Rahman to “establish a women’s affairs division in 
the president’s secretariat in 1976,” which coincided with the UN Decade for women.182 During 
the subsequent democratization era, the volume of NGOs continued to increase, and parties 
relied on established NGOs for grassroots organizing and mobilization, giving NGOs a 
significant amount of political leverage.183 While the presence of NGOs is not unique to 
Bangladesh, and recent decades have seen a “massive proliferation” of NGOs around the world, 
there are certain factors that make Bangladesh particularly appealing to donors.184 In addition to 
the natural disasters that the country has faced, Bangladesh is “one of the most densely populated 
countries in the world,” with a significant impoverished population.185   
The sheer volume of NGOs in Bangladesh indicates their influence; there are roughly 
23,000 NGOs operating and registered in Bangladesh.186 The NGO sector has a unique 
relationship with the people and government. Donors are influenced by trends in the “global 
development industry,” and when donors lose interest in a project, funding ceases.187 For 
example, microcredit programs among NGOs spread across Bangladesh due to their popularity 
among donors, demonstrating just how much sway donors can have over the process.188 
Organizations are accountable to their donors, and the target group is often not included in the 
decision-making process.189 Governments are then forced to acknowledge NGO’s role in 
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development, legitimizing itself through donor support and “publicizing any signs of approval 
from foreign agencies.”190  
Immediately after democratization, established NGOs had political leverage because they 
had established grassroots connections and could provide voter mobilization. This was most 
apparent in the election of 1996, when the government and NGOs launched “voter education 
campaigns” and the elections in 1996 and 2001 reached a voter turnout of 75%, with women 
making up roughly half.  This led the Jamaat-i-Islam party, which performed poorly in the 1996 
election with three out of three hundred seats gained, to blame their loss on NGOs turning 
mobilized rural women against the Jamaat.191 It is more likely, however, that rural women voted 
in their own self-interest and perceived that the party “presented a threat to the employment and 
educational opportunities afford rural women by the NGOs.”192 Instead, they voted for other 
parties, such as the Awami League, the Bangladesh National Party, or the Jatiyo Party, because 
they believed the Jamaat party was opposed to NGOs and women working outside the home.193  
NGOs role in education in Bangladesh has also faced criticism from Jamaat, who have 
opposed the content of curriculum and coeducation.194 There were instances of violent 
opposition to NGO presence in schools in the mid-1990s, including the burning of BRAC 
schools, and accusations that foreign funded schools were proselytizing Christianity.195 Rivalry 
between Islamic schools and NGO schools continues today, with local Islamists concerned about 
the texts being taught by NGOs.196 While the Jamaat criticize the influence of NGOs and the 
curriculum content, they are not necessarily opposed to girls education, and party leaders have 
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instead adopted a platform that women should have equal rights to education but separate 
education facilities.197 Their policy towards education on their website describes how “Islam 
gives equal emphasis on both the education of man and woman.”198 Violent opposition that did 
occur in the 1990s towards NGOs-run schools did not protest the idea of girls’ education, but 
rather, the content of education being anti-Islamic.199 The electoral importance of NGOs and the 
popularity of their programs for women and girls appears to have influenced even the most 
conservative elements of Bangladeshi politics. According to a report published in 2016, Jamaat-
e-Islami and other political Islamic groups continue to recognize the political sway held by 
secular NGOs in Bangladesh, and “pragmatically interact with secular NGOs despite ideological 
differences, particularly in areas where [NGOs] have significant influence in local politics.”200  
Opposition in Pakistan 
In Pakistan, the opposition to girls’ education can be much more violent and has led to 
school burnings and attacks on female students. Literacy rates in tribal areas where girls are not 
allowed to attend school can be as low as 9%.201 Over the past decade, hundreds of girls' schools 
have been destroyed by militants in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and lawless tribal areas 
of Pakistan.202 International attention was drawn to the story of Malala Yousafzai, who survived 
being shot by a Taliban gunman for attending school and became the youngest person to win the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2014 for her activism.  
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Figure 20: Known Terrorists Incidents on Education Institutes over Time in Pakistan 
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2018). Global 
Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.  
 
 
 
 
 
According to the Global Terrorism Database run by the University of Maryland, there 
have been 968 terrorist attacks on educational institutions since 1970, and the frequency of 
attacks on educational institution increased dramatically since 2004, the year the stipend program 
began (Figure 20). Unfortunately, the database was unable to differentiate between types of 
educational institutions, as it would be helpful to know how many attacks on girls’ schools 
occurred, nor was it able to divide attacks into provinces. It is possible that increased attacks on 
educational institutions in recent years and violent opposition to girls’ education in Pakistan 
discouraged parents from sending daughters to school and impeded greater success of the stipend 
program.   
The differences in political agendas towards gender can be demonstrated by recent 
legislation on ending child marriage, a significant barrier to girl’s secondary education. Both 
countries have high rates of child marriage, with 21% of girls in Pakistan married before the age 
of 18 and 18% of girls in Bangladesh by the age of 15. However, examining recent legal moves 
towards ending child marriage reveal differences between the countries. The minimum marriage 
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age for women in Bangladesh is 18.203  When the Cabinet tried to approve lowering the 
minimum age of marriage from 18 to 16 years for girls, it resulted “in international outcry” and 
the Act was delayed and amended.204 Meanwhile, in Pakistan, the National Assembly rejected 
increasing the legal age for marriage from 16 to 18 nationwide in 2017.205 Recent rulings from 
the Council of Islamic Ideology, “a constitutional body which gives Islamic legal advice to the 
Pakistani Government,” declared that Pakistani laws prohibiting child marriage are un-Islamic.206 
Changing legislation on child marriage in both countries was met with different obstacles, and 
indicates the different pressures each country faces when attempting to alter its laws on this 
issue. Bangladesh has a unique political history with role of NGOs and does not face quite the 
same opposition to girls’ education as Pakistan, and this could be a reason why they were able to 
achieve gender parity.   
 
6.2.4 Factor 4: Economic Changes in Bangladesh 
Economic factors may have impacted these education advances for women. In 1990, 
agriculture made up 30% of the Bangladesh's GDP, and industry made up 20%.207 In 2017, 
industry made up 28% of the GDP, and agriculture declined to 13%.208 The service sector has 
also grown significantly, from 46% in 1990 to 53% in 2017.209  These shifts are largely due to 
the success of the ready-made garment industry, which has made Bangladesh the second-largest 
                                                 
203 Girls Not Brides, https://www.girlsnotbrides.org.  
204 Ibid.  
205 Ibid.  
206 Ibid.  
207 “World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files,” The World Bank Group, 2018.   
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS?locations=BD&view=chart.  
208 Ibid.  
209 Ibid.  
Gibbons 55 
 
garment manufacturer in the world.210 This rising industry has demonstrated a hiring preference 
for women and has therefore provided large scale formal sector employment to women not 
previously available.211 It is possible that these changes have contributed to the rethinking of 
gender relations and women’s role in the public sphere that inspired the Female Stipend 
Program. Women’s participation in the ready-made garment industry has significantly altered the 
labor composition of the country. It has also been argued that these new opportunities for paid 
work provide a level of economic empowerment of women. Some authors like Schurmann have 
said that requirements for secondary education in the garment sector alongside NGO programs 
and policy interventions may have contributed to the progress in gender equality and gains in 
girls’ enrollment in schools in Bangladesh over the last two decades. However, a study by Islam 
in three garment factories in Dhaka found that only half of the female employees had completed 
primary education, and only 9% had a Secondary School Certificate.212 It is not still clear if this 
increase in demand for labor in manufacturing has increased the level of educational attainment 
among women. Further studies into the relationship between the garment industry and women’s 
education in Bangladesh are needed to determine if there is a correlation.   
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Figure 21 
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files, The World Bank 
Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most recent data collected reveals that Bangladesh has a higher percentage of wage 
and salaried workers who are female, at 28%, while Pakistan has around 24%. While the 
difference is not huge, the trends across the years tell another story; Bangladesh’s percentage 
have been steadily growing, jumping from 18% in 2010 to 24% in 2011 (Figure 21). Meanwhile, 
Pakistan’s percentage of wage and salaried female workers have fluctuated over the years 
(Figure 22). 
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Figure 22 
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files, The World Bank 
Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/ 
 
As the People’s Republic of Bangladesh shifts away from an agricultural economy, 
demand for women’s social and economic participation has increased. It is possible that demand 
for educated women in Bangladesh, and therefore, enrollment in secondary school, could be 
linked to the rise of the garment industry and available jobs. It is also unclear why Pakistan’s 
percentage of wage and salaried female workers has fluctuated so drastically. Economic factors 
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could have played a role in Bangladesh’s program to end the gender gap, but with the current 
data available, it is impossible to give a conclusive answer.  
 
6.3 Recommendations for FSSS 
There are two aspects of Bangladesh’s FSP that Pakistan might learn from; targeting and 
stipend amounts. Evidence from Khandker, Pitt, and Fuwa showed that the enrollment benefits 
from the stipend program in Bangladesh disproportionately went to girls from households with 
larger quantities of owned land.213 One of the criticisms of Bangladesh’s FSP program was that it 
failed to reach girls in underserved areas. These authors also therefore recommend land 
ownership as a targeting mechanism, citing its use by microfinance programs such as the 
Grameen Bank, as a way of making sure stipends are directed towards poorer households.214  
Targeting girls from families that own less land could create more stringent targeting, reduce 
program costs, and help stipend programs reach underserved populations.  
Drawing lessons from Bangladesh’s difficulties in reaching underserved populations, the 
Punjab provincial government may want to consider adjusting its targeting for the FSSS using its 
incoming National Socio-Economic Registry. As part of different national CCT, the Benazir 
Income Support Program (BISP), the database was launched in 2008 “to improve pro-poor 
targeting performance of respective social sector programs.”215 The database includes more than 
27 million households (approx. 167 million people) and is the first of its kind in South Asia.216 
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It is possible that scaling up the stipend amount as girls continued in school provided 
additional incentive that contributed to Bangladesh’s progress. The stakeholders behind 
Pakistan’s stipend program are experimenting with different program design ideas currently. In 
2014, a pilot of the stipend program was launched that had different stipend amounts as girls 
advance in secondary school.217  Under this program, 659 rural government schools were 
categorized into three groups: Treatment I made up of 143 schools, Treatment II made up of 155 
schools and a control group made up of the remaining 361 schools.218 In Treatment I, girls in 
grades 6-8 will receive Rs. 900 per quarter based on 80% attendance and girls in grades 9-10 will 
receive Rs. 1200 per quarter based on 80% attendance.219 In Treatment II, girls in grades 6-8 will 
receive Rs. 900 per quarter based on 80% attendance and girls in grade 9-10 will receive Rs. 
2400 upon progression to this grade based on 80% attendance in the first quarter of the school 
year and Rs. 1200 per quarter based on 80% attendance.220 The control group of girls in grades 
6-10 will receive Rs. 600 per quarter based on 80% attendance, the same benefit structure as in 
the original stipends program.221 The PESRP does not offer any explanation for why these 
treatments were chosen, but explicitly stated that the goal was to retain girls in school.222 
Treatment II, with its larger stipend amount provided on the first quarter of grades 9 and 10, 
might be determine how larger incentives impact enrollment and incentive. More observations 
about the effect of scaling up stipend amounts with age can be drawn once impact reports of 
these pilot programs in Pakistan are released. After comparing the programs’ designs, Pakistan 
might draw some lessons from Bangladesh’s program. Reconsidering whether literacy rates are 
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an efficient way of targeting populations and determining the impact of larger stipend amounts 
might help the Punjab province’s FSS reach higher enrollment rates.  
7    Conclusion  
The conclusions of case studies support the view echoed in the literature that CCTs work in 
very specific and narrow parameters to make small changes to specific human development 
indicators. Both Bangladesh’s FSSP and Pakistan’s FSS increased secondary school enrolment 
for female students and helped narrow the gender gap. It is possible that Bangladesh is simply an 
impressive outlier in enrollment outcomes compared to other CCT programs in countries of 
similar levels of income. Post-independence, Bangladesh has been influenced by an additional 
group of political actors: donor-funded NGOs. The education of girls and the role of NGOs had a 
marked impact on Bengali politics during the 1990s-2000s. Its program also had increasing 
stipend amounts with grade level, unlike Pakistan’s program. The differences between the 
education systems and budgets of the countries may have also had an impact. Pakistan’s 
education system has struggled with more institutional instability, as well as more blatant and 
militarized opposition to girls’ education. The rise of the garment industry in Bangladesh may 
have had an impact on investments in girls’ education, but the relationship is not clear.  
Bangladesh and Pakistan, for all their similarities, are different countries that face different 
barriers to girls’ education. Pakistan’s FSSS may have made more modest progress in female 
secondary school enrollment due to these programmatic, systemic, political, and economic 
factors, but research was limited by availability of data. While this paper cannot definitively say 
why Bangladesh was able to end to so rapidly end the gender gap, it was clear that conditions in 
Bangladesh were more ideal for reducing the gender gap through a CCT program. By identifying 
these possible factors, my research indicates several areas for further study, including 
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recommendations for Pakistan’s program and the relationship between the garment industry and 
demand for girls’ secondary education in Bangladesh. CCTs in parts of the world outside of 
Latin America, particularly in South Asia, continue to be underrepresented in the literature. 
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